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Abstract
We explore patterns of price competition in an oligopoly where consumers vary
in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase. In the case of nested reach
we nd equilibria, unlike those in existing models, in which price competition is
segmented: small rms o¤er only low prices and large rms only o¤er high prices. We
characterize equilibria in the three-rm case using correlation measures of interaction
between pairs of rms. We show how entry, merger and market expansion can a¤ect
patterns of price competition in novel ways.
1 Introduction
We study oligopoly pricing in a setting where consumers di¤er in their choice setsthat
is, the set of rms they consider for their purchaseand buy from the rm in their choice
set with the lowest price. Bertrand equilibrium then involves rms choosing their prices
according to mixed strategies, and a rm chooses from a range of prices. The structure of
price competition could take many forms. Firms might all choose from a similar range of
prices, or competition might be more segmented with only a small subset of rms competing
at a given price. Who competes with whom at each price is determined in equilibrium. How
does the equilibrium structure of price competition depend on the underlying structure of
consumer choice sets?
The simplest situation in which this question arises is a duopoly in which each rm has
some captive customers, while non-captive customers are able to pay the lower of the two
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rms prices. A rm then has choice between entering the fray, by competing against its
rival for the contested consumer segment with a low price, or retreating back towards
its captive base by setting a high price, and in equilibrium these strategies yield the same
prot. Even if the rms are asymmetric, they use the same interval range of prices. With
more than two rms, though, richer patterns of consumer consideration become possible.
Taking the interaction between two rms to be the overlap in the sets of consumers
who consider buying from them, di¤erent pairs of rms might have very di¤erent levels
of interaction. With more than one rival a rm can compete on several fronts, and richer
patterns of pricing also emerge. With a segmented pricing pattern, for instance, a rm
might compete against one rm when it charges a low price and another rm when it
charges a higher price.
The foundation of our model is the distribution of choice sets among consumers. There
are various reasons why di¤erent consumers have di¤erent sets of choices open to them.
Perhaps following a prior stage of advertising by rms or search by consumers, some con-
sumers become aware of a di¤erent set of suppliers than other consumers. For instance,
Draganska and Klapper (2011) document limited and heterogeneous consumer awareness
of various brands of ground co¤ee, while Honka, Hortacsu, and Vitorino (2017) do the same
for retail banks. Alternatively, as in Spiegler (2006), there might be horizontal product
di¤erentiation such that only a subset of products could meet a consumers needs. The set
of rms who are currently active in the market might be uncertain (Janssen and Rasmusen
(2002)), as might be the set of rms who choose to post prices on a comparison website
(Baye and Morgan (2001)). Some consumers might be constrained in their choices by loca-
tion, transport costs or switching costs. For instance, some models of spatial competition,
such as Smith (2004), suppose that a consumer considers buying from those rms located
within a specied radius of her. Consumers might also di¤er in their ability to make com-
parisons between o¤ers, with confused consumers choosing randomly between suppliers or
buying from a default seller (Piccione and Spiegler (2012), Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)).
Our analysis does not take a view on the underlying reason why consumers have di¤erent
choice sets. Rather, it takes the distribution of choice sets in the consumer population as
given, and explores the consequences for competition.
A considerable literature has explored aspects of this general framework, and some
settings are now well understood: (i) the case with symmetric rms; (ii) the case with
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independent reach, and (iii) the one-or-all case where consumers are either captive to
one rm or can choose between all rms. (These special cases, which overlap, are discussed
in more detail in section 2.) Within case (i), which covers the great majority of exist-
ing models, Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) considered the situation in which some
consumers are randomly captive to particular rms, while others compare the prices of
all rms and buy from the cheapest. (Thus these papers also fall under case (iii).) In
case (i) there is a symmetric equilibrium with price dispersion, in which all rms choose
prices according to the same mixed strategy. Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.3) analyze
a more general symmetric model, in which arbitrary fractions of consumers consider one
random rm, two random rms, and so on. Provided some consumers consider just one
rm and some consider more than one, the symmetric equilibrium involves price dispersion,
and industry prot is proportional to the number of captive consumers who consider just
one rm. Johnen and Ronayne (2019) show that this symmetric equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium if and only if there are some consumers who consider precisely two rms.1
In case (ii) with independent reach, the fact that a consumer considers one rm does
not a¤ect the likelihood she considers any other rm. Then the rm that reaches the most
consumers also has the largest proportion of captive consumers among the consumers within
its reachi.e., it has the highest captive-to-reach ratio. This model was studied by Ireland
(1993) and McAfee (1994), who show that in equilibrium all rms use the same minimum
price, but the maximum price charged is lower for smaller rms. Thus price supports are
nested, so that smaller rms only o¤er low prices while the largest rms o¤er the full range
of prices. Since rms use the same minimum price, their prots are proportional to their
reach.2
In case (iii), where consumers either consider just one rm or consider the whole set of
rms, was fully solved by Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1992).3 In the symmetric version
of the model (which coincides with the models of Varian and Rosenthal), when there are
more than two rms many asymmetric equilibria exist alongside the symmetric equilibrium.
1Banerjee and Kovenock (1999) study a model with symmetric rms but where the set of rms consid-
ered by consumers is not random: rms are arranged on a circle, and if a consumer considers a given rm
the only other rms she might consider are the two neighboring rms.
2This equilibrium was subsequently shown by Szech (2011) to be unique. Spiegler (2006) studies the
special case of this framework where all rms are equally likely to be considered (which therefore also ts
into case (i) with symmetric rms). Manzini and Mariotti (2014) study a choice model where an agent is
aware of a particular option with specied independent probability. In an empirical study of the personal
computer market, Sovinsky Goeree (2008) assumes that the reach of the various products is independent.
3This framework includes duopoly as a special case, which was studied by Narasimhan (1988).
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In an asymmetric market where rms have di¤erent numbers of captive customers, all
but the two smallest rms choose the monopoly price for sure, while the two smallest
rms compete using mixed strategies. Intuitively, the two rms with the fewest captive
customers have a strong interaction and compete against themselves, leaving rms with
more captives with an incentive to retreat to their captive base. This is an extreme instance
of the situation where large rms choose only high prices, which we will discuss further
at several points in the analysis to follow. In this equilibrium, each rm except for the
smallest obtains prot proportional to the number of its captive customers (rather than
being proportional to its reach as with case (ii)).
While these three special cases are natural benchmarks, in practice patterns of consumer
consideration will fall outside these cases. For example, in their study of ground co¤ee
Draganska and Klapper (2011) document in their sample that rms are not close to being
symmetric (Table 2), that consumer awareness is far from independent across brands (Table
5), and that the choice sets of many consumers consisted neither of a single rm nor of
the whole set of rms (Figure 1). The aim of the present paper is to provide a unifying
framework which encompasses special cases (i) to (iii), but which allows us to study richer
situations outside these cases as well, and to discover new types of equilibrium interaction.
The analysis is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the general framework,
and recapitulate the analysis for the special cases (i) to (iii). In section 3 we introduce
and analyse nested reach, in which only the largest rm has any captive customers, and
if the increments between successive rm sizes are non-decreasing we nd equilibria with
a form of segmented pricing which we term overlapping duopoly: there is an increasing
sequence of prices fpkg such that the range of prices that the kth smallest rm might
charge is an interval [pk 1; pk+1]. Hence small rms charge low prices while large rms
charge high prices, and rms compete against precisely one rival with any price they o¤er.
Section 4 then provides a general analysis of the three-rm case. Even with triopoly,
a wide variety of patterns of consumer consideration is possible. We dene a measure
of the interaction between a pair of rms, which reects correlation between consumer
consideration of the two rms. When interactions between pairs of rms are similar, as
with independent reach, we show that all rms use a common lowest price and hence
have prot proportional to their reach. In some of these cases, however, we nd that
the price support of the least competitive rm might not be an intervalthe rm might
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price high and low but not in an intermediate range. By contrast, when one pair of rms
has signicantly more interaction than other pairs, the equilibrium has the overlapping
duopoly propertyone rm prices low, one high, and one across the full price range.
Intuitively, this pair mostly compete with each other, leaving the remaining rm with an
incentive to set high prices.
When the interaction increases between one pair of rmse.g., if additional consumers
consider both rmsthis can induce the remaining rm to retreat towards its captive
base. While entry into a duopoly market by a third rm often pushes down prices, there
are natural patterns of interaction where, counter-intuitively, the opposite happens and
consumers are harmed by entry. Again, the reason is that more intense competition in
the contested segment induces incumbents to retreat towards their captive base. We also
discuss the impact of mergers in our framework. It is common for protable mergers to
harm consumers (in the absence of cost synergies), which is always the case for three-to-two
mergers, but we also describe situations where a protable merger between two rms with
a strong interaction can reduce industry prot. The reason is that such a merger opens up
a protable front for the non-merging rms, and induces these rms to enter the fray
from their captive bases.
We conclude in section 5 by summarizing our main insights, and suggesting avenues for
further research on this topic.
2 A model with consumer choice sets
There are n rms that costlessly supply a homogeneous product. There is a population of
consumers of total measure normalized to 1, each of whom has unit demand and is willing
to pay up to 1 for a unit of the product.4 Consumers di¤er according to which rms they
consider for their purchase, and for each subset S  f1; :::; ng of rms (including the null
set) suppose that the fraction of consumers who consider exactly the subset S is S. (We
slightly abuse notation, and write 1 for the fraction who consider only rm 1, 12 = 21
for the fraction who consider only rms 1 and 2, and so on.) When there are only few rms
the pattern of choice sets can be illustrated using a Venn diagram, and Figure 1 depicts
4The positive analysis which follows is not a¤ected if each consumer has a downward-sloping demand
function x(p), provided revenue px(p) is an increasing function up to the monopoly price. However, welfare
analysis (for instance in our discussion of entry) requires adjustment with downward-sloping demand.
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a market with three rms.5 Here, a consumer considers a particular subset of rms if she
lies inside the circle of each of those rms. For instance, a fraction 12 of consumers
consider the two rms 1 and 2.
A consumer is captive to rm i if she considers i but no other other rm, and there is
a fraction i of such consumers. The reach of rm i is the set of consumers who consider
the rm, and the fraction of such consumers is denoted i, so that
i =
X
Sji2S
S :
Finally, the captive-to-reach ratio of rm i is denoted i, where
i =
i
i
:
Figure 1: Choice sets with three rms
Firms compete in a one-shot Bertrand manner, and a consumer buys from the rm she
considers that has the lowest price (provided this price is no greater than 1). In particular,
a rm o¤ers a uniform price to all its potential customers, and cannot make its price to
a consumer contingent on the choice set of that consumer.6 If two or more rms choose
the same lowest price, we suppose that the consumer is equally likely to buy from any
5In a spatial context this Venn diagram has a more literal interpretation: if consumers only consider
buying from a rm within a specied distance, then the locations of rms determine the centre of the circles
on the diagram. With more rms (and a nite set of consumers), consideration sets can be conveniently
depicted using a bipartite graph, where the two groups in the graph are the consumers and the rms, and
a line connecting a consumer to a rm corresponds to the former considering the latter. In a very di¤erent
context, Prat (2018) uses a model of consideration sets similar to that presented here.
6In Armstrong and Vickers (2019) we investigate the impact of rms being able to o¤er di¤erent deals
to captive and contested customers.
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such rm. Since industry prot is a continuous function of the vector of prices chosen,
Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) shows that an equilibrium exists. Since an
individual rms prot is usually discontinuous in the price vector, the equilibrium will
usually involve mixed strategies for some rms. We make assumptions to rule out some
extreme and uninteresting congurations. The rst requires that there be some interaction
between rms:
Assumption 1: Some consumers consider at least two rms.
(If all customers were captive, each rm chooses p  1 for sure.) The second assumption
prohibits the possibility that a subset of rms choose the competitive price p  0 for sure,
as such rms play no important role in the analysis:
Assumption 2: Every non-empty subset of rms S contains at least one rm with con-
sumers within its reach who consider no other rm in S.
For instance, this assumption rules out the situation where two rms reach precisely the
same set of consumers. Intuitively, Assumption 2 ensures that no subset S of rms will
set p  0, since there is a rm in S which has some customers with no overlap with other
rms in S, and this rm can protably raise its price above zero. These two assumptions
together imply that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, and at least some rms
choose their price according to a mixed strategy.
When rm i chooses price p  1 it will sell to a consumer when that consumer is within
its reach and when none of the other rms the consumer considers o¤ers a lower price.
Therefore, when rival rms j 6= i choose price according to the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) Fj(p), rm is expected demand with price p  1 is
qi(p) 
X
Sji2S
S
0
@Y
j2S=i
(1  Fj(p))
1
A : (1)
Here, the sum is over all consumer segments which consider rm i, and for each such
segment the product is over all rivals for rm i in that segment. (If there are no such
rivals, i.e., when the segment comprises rm is captive customers, we use the convention
that this product equals 1.7) Equilibrium occurs when for each rm i there exists a prot
7Expression (1) is written without taking into account the possibility of ties; however, Lemma 1 shows
that ties do not occur with positive probability.
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level i and a CDF Fi(p) such that rm is prot pqi(p) is equal to i for every price in
rm is support and no higher than i for any price outside its support.
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The following result collects a number of observations about the structure of price
competition in equilibrium, some of which are familiar from the existing literature.9
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium:
(i) rm i obtains prot i  i, with equality for at least one rm, and the minimum price
in its support is no smaller than i;
(ii) each rm obtains positive prot (even if it has no captive customers) and p0, the
minimum price chosen by any rm, is positive;
(iii) each rms price distribution is continuous (that is, has no atoms) in the half-open
interval [p0; 1);
(iv) each price in the interval [p0; 1] lies in the price support of at least two rms;
(v) if there are three or more rms, there is at least one price which lies in the support of
three or more rms, and
(vi) p0 lies weakly between the second lowest i and the highest i. If the rm with the
highest i has p0 in its support then p0 is equal to the highest i.
Proof. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Comparative statics with regard to market changes can naturally be studied within
this framework of limited choice sets. For instance, entry by a new rm can be modelled
as a new circle superimposed onto the existing Venn diagram. That is, entry does
not a¤ect which consumers consider the incumbent rms, and the reach of an incumbent
rm is una¤ected by entry, although its number of captive customers will weakly fall.10
Since welfare (consumer surplus plus industry prot) is the total number of consumers
reached, it follows that entry (if it is costless) will weakly increase welfare. Likewise, if
entry reduces industry prot it will benet consumers. Mergers also have a natural set-
theoretic interpretation in this framework: when two or more rms merge we assume that
the merged entity sets the same price to all its customers, and that the set of consumers
8As usual, the support of rm is price distribution is dened to be the smallest closed set P  [0; 1]
such that the probability that the rm chooses a price in P equals one.
9For instance, see McAfee (1994, page 28).
10In particular, there is no danger of choice overload, whereby the number of consumers who compare
prices falls when there are more rms, as discussed for instance in Spiegler (2011, page 150).
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who consider the merged entity is the union of the sets of consumers who considered the
separate rms.11 Thus, a merger (with no accompanying cost synergies) has no impact
on welfare, and harms consumers if and only if it increases industry prot. Note that
the fraction of consumers reached by the merged rm is no greater than the sum of those
reached by the separate rms, while the captive base of the merged rm is no smaller than
the sum of captives of the separate rms. Finally, a market expansion can be modelled as
an increase in the fractions of consumers in each non-empty segment of the Venn diagram
(taken from the consumer segment ; who previously had no choice).
As discussed in the introduction, previous work has studied the cases with symmetric
rms, with independent reach, and where consumers are either captive to one rm or can
choose from all rms, and we next describe those cases and add comments about entry
and mergers.
Symmetric rms: Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.3) study a market with n  2 sym-
metric rms and where consumers consider rms at random (a specied fraction consider
one random rm, a specied fraction consider two random rms, and so on). This model
can be generalised somewhat so that rms are symmetric but choice sets need not be ran-
dom. Specically, suppose that each rm has a1 captive customers, a2 consumers who
consider exactly one other rm (not necessarily random), and in general am consumers
who consider m  1 other rms for m  n. Let
(x)  a1 + a2x+ a3x
2 + :::+ anx
n 1
be the probability generating function associated with the number of rivals faced by a rm.
Here, (x) is convex and increasing, the number of captive customers for each rm is (0),
each rm has reach  = (1) and captive-to-reach ratio  = (0)=(1). Assumptions 1
and 2 imply 0 < (0) < (1).
In a symmetric market, the unique symmetric equilibrium (which is not necessarily the
only equilibrium) is derived as follows. Each rm obtains equilibrium prot i  (0) and
has the minimum price . When each of its rivals uses the CDF F (p), a rms demand with
price p  1 in (1) is q(p) = (1  F (p)). Since each rm makes prot (0), the symmetric
11An alternative approach would be for the merged entity to maintain separate brands and to be able
to charge distinct prices for each brand.
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equilibrium CDF satises
(1  F (p)) 
(0)
p
; (2)
and the function F (p) strictly increases from 0 to 1 as p increases from  to 1.
The models in Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) are special cases of this framework,
where consumers either consider one random rm or consider all rms, so that am = 0 for
1 < m < n. With this pattern of consideration, Baye et al. (1992) show that when n  3
there are multiple equilibria (all of which involve the same prot for rms). For instance,
one asymmetric equilibrium has all but two rms choosing p = 1 for sure, selling only to
their captive customers, while the remaining two rms choose prices on the interval [; 1].
In general, entry by a new rm into a symmetric market has ambiguous e¤ects on
industry prot and consumer surplus, as we discuss in more detail in section 4. However,
a merger between two or more rms in a symmetric market is always protable. Before
merger each rm obtained prot equal to its captive base, and a merger can only increase
the merged entitys number of captive customers. Amerger cannot decrease the prot of the
non-merging rms (since they still obtain at least their captive prot), and so the merger
increases industry prot and harms consumers. Finally, in this symmetric conguration
there are search externalities, in the sense that an increase in the number of consumers
who consider more than one rm (i.e., an increase in am for some m  2) will benet all
existing consumers (including those captive to a rm). To see this, note that an increase
in am for m  2 induces a rise in the F (p) which solves (2), and so each rm will lower its
price in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Independent reach: Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) study the situation where each
rm has an independent chance of being considered by a consumer. Specically, rm i
is considered by an independent fraction i of the consumer population, where rms are
labelled so that 0 < 1  2  :::  n  1. (Assumption 2 requires n 1 < 1.) The
fraction of consumers captive to rm i is i = ij 6=i(1  j) and so this rms captive-to-
reach ratio is i = j 6=i(1  j). Thus the rm with the largest reach is also the rm with
the highest captive-to-reach ratio n = 
n 1
i=1 (1  i).
Firm i sells to a consumer when it chooses price p if it reaches that consumer (which
occurs with probability i) and no rival reaches that consumer with a lower price. If rm
j chooses its price with the CDF Fj(p), the probability that rm j reaches the consumer
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with a lower price is jFj(p). Therefore, rm is demand with price p  1 in (1) takes the
multiplicatively separable form
qi(p) = i
Y
j 6=i
(1  jFj(p)) : (3)
Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) show that the equilibrium is such that all rms have
the same minimum price p0 = n, and the prot of rm i is i = ip0. Thus, rms prots
are proportional to their reaches, and the prot of the largest rm is equal to its number
of captive consumers, while the prot of smaller rms is weakly greater than their number
of captive consumers. The CDFs which support these equilibrium prots are such that
rm i chooses its price with interval support [p0; pi], where rm is maximum price pi is
smaller for smaller rms. The two largest rms choose prices with support [p0; 1], so that
the maximum prices satisfy p1  p2  :::  pn 1 = pn = 1.
Industry prot is  = (
Pn
i=1 i) p0, total welfare is the fraction of consumers who
consider at least one rm which is 1  (1  n)p0, and the di¤erence between welfare and
prot is consumer surplus
CS = 1 

1 +
n 1P
i=1
i

p0 : (4)
Consumer surplus does not depend on the reach of the largest rm, n, but increases with
the reach of each smaller rm.
The model with independent reach has intuitive properties with respect to entry and
mergers. Entry by a rm which also has independent reach will increase consumer surplus
(4). If the entrant is not the largest rm in the market, so its reach is E < n, then the
minimum price p0 falls by the multiplicative factor (1   E) which outweighs the impact
of the additional E in the sum in the term () in (4).
12 If two rms i and j merge, the
merged entity has independent reach i + j   ij. Since this combined reach is lower
than the sum of the pre-merger reaches, the only way the merger can be protable is if the
minimum price p0 rises after the merger, in which case the non-merging rms also increase
their prot after the merger.13 A protable merger must therefore increase industry prot,
and so reduce consumer surplus.
12If the entrant is the largest rm in the market, then the same analysis applies with n replacing E .
13It is only possible for a merger to raise the minimum price if the merged entity is the largest rm in
the post-merger market. For instance, one can check that a merger between the two largest rms is always
protable.
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One-or-all choice: Suppose there are n  2 rms, where  > 0 consumers consider all
rms and i consumers consider only rm i. No consumers consider intermediate numbers
of rms, and so the reach of rm i is i = +i. We have already discussed the symmetric
case 1 = ::: = n, so as in Baye et al. (1992, Section V) suppose that 1 < 2 < ::: < n.
Suppose rst that n = 2, which is the situation studied by Narasimhan (1988). Lemma 1
then determines the unique equilibrium, which is that both rms have the same support for
prices, [p0; 1], where p0 = 2=2 is the larger captive-to-reach ratio, and rm i = 1; 2 has
prot i = ip0. To maintain indi¤erence for rm j, the CDF used by rm i in equilibrium,
Fi, satises
p[j   Fi(p)]  jp0 : (5)
Similarly to independent reach, the smaller rms prot exceeds its captive prot 1 while
the larger rm obtains exactly its captive prot.
Industry prot in equilibrium is
 = (1 + 2)p0 = 1 + 2     
1
2
: (6)
One can check that industry prot increases with each portion in the Venn diagram (i.e.,
with 1, 2 and ), so that any market expansion boosts industry prot. Total welfare is
the total number of consumers reached,W = 1+2 , and consumer surplus is therefore
CS = 
1
2
:
Thus, keeping reaches constant, consumer surplus increases when the overlap  is larger,
even though fewer consumers are then served. Likewise, consumer surplus decreases when
the larger rms set of captive customers expands, keeping the other regions of the Venn
diagram unchanged, even though more consumers are served.
To extend this analysis to more than two rms, introduce additional rms i = 3; :::; n,
all with i > 2. If the smallest rms, 1 and 2, continue to use the price strategies (5), one
can check that each rm i  3 is better o¤ choosing the monopoly price p = 1 than to o¤er
any lower price. Thus it is an equilibrium for the two smallest rms to follow the above
duopoly strategies, and for all larger rms to serve only their captive base and choose the
monopoly price for sure.14 The result is that all rms except the smallest one obtain their
captive prot, and only the two smallest rms ever choose prices below the monopoly level.
14Baye et al. (1992) show this to be the unique equilibrium.
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In this framework a merger between rms, falling short of a merger to monopoly, leaves
the number of captive customers unchanged. As a result, almost all pair-wise mergers leave
the merged entitys prot unchanged or cause it to fall. In fact, in contrast to independent
reach, the only way a pair of rms could protably merge is if the merged rm is the
smallest rm in the post-merger market. Such a merger has no impact on the non-merging
rms prots and so increases industry prot and harms consumers.
In the remainder of the paper we show that other, richer possibilities exist outside these
special cases. We start in the next section by describing how a radically di¤erent kind of
equilibrium can arise when rms have nested reach.
3 Nested reach
The situation with independent reach has all consumers being equally likely to be reached
by a rm, regardless of which other rms they consider. At the other extreme one could
envisage consideration sets as being nested, in the sense that if rm i reaches a greater
fraction of consumers than rm j, all rm js consumers also consider rm i. For example,
an entrants reach lies inside an incumbents reach if only a subset of latters existing
customers are willing to consider buying from the entrant. Likewise, if consumers consider
options in an ordered fashion, as may be the case with internet search results (where
some consumers just consider the rst result, others consider the rst two, and so on),
then the reach of a lower ranked option is nested inside that of a higher ranked option.
Alternatively, if consumers only consider the rms whose product they nd suits their
tastes, then low-quality rms might be considered by only a subset of the consumers who
consider a higher-quality rm. With nested reach, only the largest rm has any captive
customers, and a smaller rm has positive demand only if its price is below all the prices
of larger rms.
As depicted in Figure 2, suppose there are n  3 rms with nested reach. Let rm i
have reach i, where rms are ordered as 0 < 1 < 2 < ::: < n, and for i  2 write
i = i   i 1 for the incremental reach of rm i. While it is hard to nd the equilibrium
in all nested situations, the following result describes equilibrium in those cases where
incremental reach is larger for larger rms.
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Proposition 1 Suppose n  3 rms have nested reach such that
0 < 2  :::  n : (7)
Then there is an equilibrium with price thresholds p1 < p2 < ::: < pn 1 < pn = 1 such that
the price support of rm 1 is [p1; p2], the support of rm n is [pn 1; pn], and the support of
rm 1 < i < n is [pi 1; pi+1]. Thus, only rms i and i+ 1 (where 1  i < n) choose prices
in the interval (pi; pi+1). The thresholds are determined recursively by p2 =
1+2
2
p1 and
for 1 < i < n
pi+1 = pi +
i
i+1
pi 1 ; (8)
where p1 is chosen to make pn = 1. The prot of rm 1 is 1 = 1p1 and the prot of rm
i > 1 is i = ipi.
The format of this equilibrium consists of overlapping duopolies, where each price is
in the support of exactly two rms,15 and where smaller rms only choose low prices while
larger rms only choose high prices.16 In this sense there is segmented price competition
rather than head-to-head price competition, even though there is head-to-head competition
in terms of consumer consideration (as rm 1s potential customers consider all rms).
Nevertheless, the presence of large rms a¤ects the prots of smaller rms, and (except for
the very largest rm) vice versa.
To illustrate, consider the case where reach decays with a constant rate of attrition, so
that the reach of rm i = 1; :::; n is i = 
n i. In this case i = 
n i(1  ) which increases
with i as required for Proposition 1, and equation (8) becomes pi+1 = pi + pi 1. When
n = 2 the two rms have reaches 1 = 1  and 2 = 1, and the duopoly analysis in section
2 shows that the minimum price is 1   and industry prot is 2 = 1  
2. When n = 3,
Proposition 1 implies that the two threshold prices are p1 =
1 
1+(1 ) and p2 =
1
1+(1 ) and
that industry prot is 3 = 1 
2
1+(1 ) . Both 2 and 3 decrease from 1 to 0 as  increases
from 0 to 1. Perhaps surprisingly, though, when 0 <  < 1 the prot with three rms is
15With the exception of the threshold prices p2; :::; pn 1, which are in the support of three rms.
16A similar pattern of segmented pricing is seen in Bulow and Levin (2006). They study a matching
model where n heterogeneous rms each wish to hire a single worker from a pool with n heterogeneous
workers, where the payo¤ from a match is (in the simplest version of their model) the product of qualities
of the rm and worker. Firms choose wages which they must pay regardless of the quality of the worker
eventually hired, workers care only about their wage, and higher quality workers choose their employer
rst. In equilibrium, rms o¤er wages according to mixed strategies, where higher quality rms o¤er wages
in a higher range than lower quality rms.
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strictly higher than with two rms. Since the change from n = 2 to n = 3 corresponds to
entry by a third rm with reach 2 into the duopoly market, this implies that entry of this
form raises industry prot.17 Since no new consumers are served by the entrant, it follows
that entry harms consumers in aggregate, even though the minimum price o¤ered in the
market is lower after entry.
Figure 2: Three rms with nested reach
Proposition 1 can be used to obtain an expression for industry prot with any n.
However, the analysis simplies in the limit with many rms, when one can show that the
threshold prices are given by the geometric progression ; 2; :::, where  = 2
1+
p
1+4
 1,
and the minimum price o¤ered converges to zero. Industry prot is 1 = (1   )(1 +
 + ()2 + :::) = 1 
1  . This limit prot also decreases from 1 to 0 as  increases, and
satises 2 < 1 < 3 when 0 <  < 1. Thus entry has a non-monotonic e¤ect on
industry prot, rst increasing and then decreasing prot (although the limit prot with
many rms remains above that with duopoly). We discuss the possibility that entry can
harm consumers in more detail in the next section, using a more transparent framework
with symmetric incumbents.18
Proposition 1 describes equilibrium only for cases where incremental reach weakly in-
creases. In the next section we thoroughly analyse our general framework in the case of
triopoly, and nd that overlapping duopoly pricing is by no means special to the nested
conguration. We will also obtain results that imply for the case of nested reach that
17Entry does not a¤ect the prot of the largest rm, which obtains its captive prot in either case, but
it reduces the prot of the smaller incumbent. However, the prot obtained by the entrant outweighs the
lost prot of this incumbent.
18Another case which is easily solved is when incremental reach i is constant, in which case (8) entails
pi+1 = pi + pi 1. It follows that threshold prices are proportional to the Fibonacci sequence.
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(i) when 3 > 2 the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is unique and (ii) when 3 < 2 the
equilibrium instead has all three rms using the same minimum price. However, in the
latter case we will see that the largest rm can sometimes have a gap in its price support,
so that it charges high and low prices but not intermediate prices.
4 The three-rm problem
In all the asymmetric congurations considered so far (independent reach, one-or-all
choice, and nested reach) there is a clear-cut ordering of the rms, in the sense that a rm
with a larger reach also has a weakly higher captive-to-reach ratio. More generally, though,
these two ways to order rms need not coincide. For instance, a niche rm could have
limited reach but have a high proportion of its reach being captive. In this section we allow
for general patterns of consumer consideration in the context of triopoly.
Consider the triopoly market shown on Figure 1. For each pair of rms i and j dene
ij =
ij + 
ij
;
where to simplify notation we have written  = 123. The parameter ij reects correlation
in the reach of rms i and j: i and j are the respective probabilities that a consumer
considers rm i and rm j while (ij + ) is the probability she considers both rms, and
so ij is above or below 1 according to whether consideration of rm i is positively or
negatively correlated with consideration of rm j. With independent reach we have all
ij = 1, while if the reach of rms i and j is disjoint then ij = 0. The pair of rms with
the largest ij can be thought of having the strongest interaction in the market. As we
will see, if only two rms choose the lowest price p0 in equilibrium, while the third rm
only uses higher prices, they will be the pair of rms with the largest ij.
Similarly, write
 =

123
;
which is again equal to 1 with independent reach. Note that k  ij for distinct i, j
and k, with equality if and only if ij = 0. For simplicity, if Fi(p) is rm is CDF for
price in equilibrium write Gi(p)  iFi(p), so that Gi increases from zero to i. Using this
notation, rm is demand at price p in (1) is
qi = iFjFk + i(1  Fj)(1  Fk) + (i + ij)(1  Fj)Fk + (i + ik)Fj(1  Fk)
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= i + FjFk   ( + ij)Fj   ( + ik)Fk (9)
= i[1 + GjGk   ijGj   ikGk] : (10)
Our main result in this section shows that the form of equilibrium depends on whether
or not the interactions between rms, measured by ij, are similar or asymmetric.
Proposition 2 Suppose that rms are labelled so that rms 2 and 3 have the strongest
interaction, i.e., 23  maxf12; 13g.
(i) If
minf2; 3g < 12 + 13   23 (11)
then in equilibrium all rms have the same minimum price p0, which is the highest captive-
to-reach ratio among the rms;
(ii) If
minf2; 3g > 12 + 13   23 (12)
then equilibrium takes the form of overlapping duopoly: if rms 2 and 3 are labelled so
3  2, then there are prices p0 and p1, with p0 < p1  1, such that rm 3 has price
support [p0; p1], rm 2 has support [p0; 1] and rm 1 has support [p1; 1]. (If 2 = 3 then
p1 = 1 and rm 1 chooses p  1 for sure.) Explicit expressions for the thresholds p0 and
p1, as well as for the prots of the three rms, are given in the proof.
This result shows that only limited kinds of pricing patterns can emerge in equilibrium.
For example, it cannot be that two rms choose prices over a range [p0; 1] while the third
rm only chooses from an intermediate or upper range of prices.
Part (i) of this result applies when interactions are similar across pairs of rms (and
where some consumers consider exactly two rms so that k < ij), as is the case with
independent reach. Indeed, part (i) applies if the two pairs with the greatest interaction
have a similar interaction: if say 23 = 13  12 and there are some consumers who
consider exactly two rms then condition (11) is satised. In particular, if in the statement
of Proposition 2 there is a tie for which pair of rms has the strongest interaction, then
part (i) must apply. With nested reach the two smallest rms have the strongest interaction
and condition (11) requires that incremental reach is smaller for larger rms. Thus with
three nested rms, the cases not covered by Proposition 1 have all rms using the same
minimum price.
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Part (ii) applies when one pair of rms has signicantly stronger interaction than other
pairs. For instance, if rms 2 and 3 are considered by almost the same set of consumers
(so their circles on the Venn diagram almost coincide), and if 1 > 0, then rms 2 and
3 have the greatest interaction and condition (12) is satised, and rm 1 chooses price
p  1. Intuitively, when two rms reach nearly the same set of consumers, they compete
ercely between themselves, leaving the remaining rm to price at or near the monopoly
level. Likewise, if rm 1 has a large captive base so that 1 is large (and when rms 2 and
3 have some overlap), then rms 2 and 3 have the greatest interaction and condition (12)
is satised. With nested reach, condition (12) requires that incremental reach is larger for
larger rms, thus verifying Proposition 1. Another situation where (12) holds is the one-
or-all specication in Baye et al. (1992, Section V), where no consumer considers exactly
two rms and 1 > 2  3, in which case ij = =(ij) and the two smallest rms 2 and
3 have the greatest interaction. Yet another conguration where part (ii) applies is when
two rms have disjoint reach, so that 13 =  = 0 say, in which case (12) holds whenever
12 6= 23. Thus the only way that two rms can have overlapping price supports is if they
have overlapping reach.
In the knife-edge case where
minf2; 3g = 12 + 13   23 ; (13)
which is not covered by Proposition 2, there is the possibility that both kinds of equilibrium
coexist. For instance, this is so in the symmetric Varian-type market where 12 = 13 =
23 = 0 and 1 = 2 = 3, where there is a symmetric equilibrium where all rms price
low and also asymmetric equilibria where one of the rms chooses p  1. (See Baye et al.
(1992) for the full range of equilibria in this market.)
Equilibrium strategies when all rms use the same minimum price: Proposition 2 provided
much information about equilibria in this modelit characterises equilibrium prot and
consumer surplus in the two regimes, and it describes equilibrium strategies when part (ii)
applies. However, it does not describe equilibrium pricing strategies for part (i), and the
equilibrium patterns of prices turn out to have interesting economic properties.
In the earlier version of this paper (Armstrong and Vickers, 2018, Proposition 2) we
calculated an equilibrium whenever part (i) applied (without showing if it was unique),
and this took one of two forms: either (a) the three rms were active in a lower price range
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and then two were active in a range of higher prices, or (b) the three rms were active in
a lower price range, then only the most competitive pair were active in an intermediate
price range, and then another pair of rms were active in a higher range. In particular,
in situation (b) one rm (rm 1 using the labelling in Proposition 2) chose low and high
prices, but not intermediate prices.
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Figure 3: Ironing in a nested market with 1 = 1=2, 2 = 4=5, 3 = 1
The general analysis was complicated, and here we merely report an example to show
the possibility. Suppose three rms have nested reach, where 3 =
1
2
, 2 =
4
5
and 1 = 1.
We show in the appendix that equilibrium with this pattern of choice sets has all rms
choosing prices in the range [1
5
; 9
25
], rms 2 and 3 choosing prices in the range [ 9
25
; 16
25
] and
rms 1 and 2 choosing prices in the range [16
25
; 1]. The reason why the largest rm has non-
convex price support can be explained as follows. When all rms price low in equilibrium,
so that part (i) of Proposition 2 applies, one can calculate that the three CDFs increase
in p for prices just above p0, the minimum price. (This is ensured by condition (11).) One
can also calculate the smallest price, p1 say, at which some CDF reaches 1 and above which
the two remaining rms compete as duopolists for prices up to 1. (In the nested case, it is
the smallest rms CDF which rst reaches 1, although in the general model more detailed
analysis is required to determine which rm rst drops out.)
However, in some casesas in this examplerm 1s candidate CDF (i.e., when we
ignore the monotonicity constraint on the CDF) starts to decrease in p before the largest
CDF reaches 1, which cannot therefore be a valid CDF. Figure 3 illustrates rm 1s can-
didate CDF if we ignored its monotonicity constraint. The correct CDF for this rm is
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then obtained by ironing this curve as shown on the gure, so that the largest rm does
not choose prices in the interval denoted by the dashed line, which in this example is the
interval ( 9
25
; 16
25
). (This CDF does not reach 1 since this rm has an atom at p = 1 in
equilibrium.)
The equilibria with ironingwhen one rms price support has a gap in the middle
provide insight into the relationship between the two seemingly contrasting parts of Propo-
sition 2. A conguration which is well inside the parameter space dened by (11) will
have a pattern of prices similar to that with independent reach: all three rms choose
low prices, then rm 3 drops out leaving rms 1 and 2 to compete in the range with high
prices. As parameters change to approach the boundary (13), the candidate CDF for rm
1 will start to decrease before rm 3s CDF reaches 1. In this case, the ironing proce-
dure is used so that rm 1s price support has a gap in the middle. As the boundary (13)
is reached, the lower price range where all three rms are active shrinks and ultimately
vanishes, leaving an equilibrium of the overlapping duopoly form when parameters lie in
the region (12).
The impact of entry: As an application of this analysis, consider the impact of entry
by a third rm into a duopoly market. If the three rms have independent reach, then
as discussed in section 2 entry will always increase consumer surplus. Beyond this case,
however, the analysis is less clear cut. Entry might induce an incumbent to retreat towards
its captive base by raising its price, thereby harming its captive customers. This is the case,
for example, when the set of consumers reached by the entrant approximately coincides
with the set reached by one of the incumbents. Then these rms will set prices p  0,
while the other incumbent chooses p  1 and almost fully exploits its captive customers.
Nevertheless, since entry of this form reduces industry prot, consumers overall will benet.
In section 3 we have already seen examples where entry harms consumers overall. These
involved nested reach with a constant rate of decay in consideration, where entry by a third
smaller rm induced overlapping duopoly pricing with the result that the minimum price
fell after entry. This kind of nested entry does not a¤ect the number of captive customers
in the market. More generally, when entry only occurs within contested segments there is
a tendency for entry to harm consumers overall.
To illustrate, suppose the incumbents are symmetric and the entrant is considered only
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by those consumers who already consider both incumbents, as shown on Figure 4. This
pattern of consideration is reasonable if only savvy consumers consider buying from the
entrant, and these are the consumers who are already able to consider both incumbents. In
this case part (i) of Proposition 2 applies to the post-entry market (provided the entrants
reach lies strictly inside the incumbents overlap). The minimum price is equal to an
incumbents captive-to-reach ratio, which is unchanged with entry. Thus, entry of this
form leaves welfare and incumbent prot una¤ected, increases industry prot due to the
prot obtained by the entrant, and so harms consumers. In fact, it is perfectly possible
that even the consumers who consider all three rms are harmed by this form of entry,
despite being able to choose among more rms, as the higher prices o¤ered by incumbents
leave the entrant relatively free to set high prices too.
Figure 4: Entry into the contested market
This result is related to Rosenthal (1980), where entry by a new rm causes the average
price paid by both captive and informed consumers to rise. However, in his model the
entrant arrives with its own new pool of captive customers, thus raising welfare, whereas
the e¤ect arises in our scenario despite the entrant having none.19
The impact of market expansion: Another informative comparative statics exercise is to
consider the impact of a market expansion. An old intuition is that an increase in the num-
19Relatedly, in a setting with di¤erentiated products, Chen and Riordan (2008) show how entry to a
monopoly market can induce the incumbent to raise its price. For instance, entry by generic pharmaceuti-
cals might cause a branded incumbent to raise its price, as it prefers to focus on those captive customers
who care particularly about its brand. Closer to the consideration set framework is Chen and Riordan
(2007), who study a model with symmetric rms, where consumers either consider a single random rm or
consider a random pair of rms. Among other results, they show that the equilibrium price can increase
when an additional rm enters.
ber of comparison shoppersconsumers who compare prices from several rmsinduce
rms to lower their prices, which benets all consumers including captives. As discussed in
section 2, this is true in a symmetric market where an increase in the number of consumers
who considerm  2 rms induces all rms to reduce their prices. However, this is less clear
more generally. If the interaction between one pair of rm increases disproportionately,
this could give a third rm an incentive to raise its price, thereby harming its captive cus-
tomers. To illustrate, starting from a symmetric triopoly market, if we increase 23 then
part (ii) of Proposition 2 will eventually apply, in which case rm 1 will focus on exploiting
its captive base and choose p  1. Thus, increased interaction between two rms can harm
the captives of a third rm.20
Consider next the impact of a market expansion on industry prot. With duopoly, we
have seen that an increase in any or all of the three parameters 1, 2 and 12 must increase
industry prot (although it might reduce one rms prot). With duopoly, increasing the
size of the overlap region 12 will intensify competition (in the sense that the minimum price
p0 is reduced), but this is outweighed by impact on each rms reach so that (1+2)p0 rises.
With triopoly, by contrast, increasing the fractions in some regions of the Venn diagram
can intensify competition to an extent that outweighs the market expansion e¤ect, so that
industry prot falls. To see this, consider a triopoly market where part (i) of Proposition
2 applies, in which case industry prot is
 = (1 + 2 + 3)p0 ; (14)
where p0 is the highest captive-to-reach ratio. If rm 1 has the highest captive-to-reach
ratio, then a small increase in that rms overlap regions 12, 13 or  will keep the form of
the equilibrium unchanged, but the minimum price p0 will fall. Firm 1s prot is unchanged
(since it obtains its captive prot regardless), and one can calculate that the impact on
industry prot (14) of an increase in 12 or 13 is negative if 1 < 2+3, while an increase
in  reduces prot if 21 < 2 + 3.
20A similar e¤ect can occur when the fraction of consumers who consider all three rms rises. For
instance, suppose consumer segments are (proportional to) 1 = 3 and 2 = 3 = 12 = 13 = 23 = 1,
then for any  rms 2 and 3 are the most competitive pair, and for small  part (i) of the proposition
applies, while if  is increased part (ii) eventually applies in which case rm 1 chooses p  1. Here,
an increase in  a¤ects the interaction between rms 2 and 3 disproportionately, and pushes the market
towards segmented pricing.
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The impact of a merger: We discussed in section 2, within the three special patterns of
consideration described there, how a protable merger harmed consumers overall. We now
show that the same is always true in the three-rm case. Specically, we show that a
protable merger between two rms necessarily increases the third rms prot. Suppose
that rm N is the one not merging. If N s pre-merger prot was equal to its captive prot
N , the merger of the other two rms clearly cannot reduce that. If N s pre-merger prot
was equal to Np0i.e., its reach times the minimum pricethen the merger between the
other two will increase N s prot because the minimum price must rise for the merger to
be protable.21 The only remaining possibility is a merger between rms 2 and 3 in the
conditions of part (ii) of Proposition 2 where, moreover, rm 2 has an atom at p = 1. We
show in the appendix that a protable merger increases 1s prot in this case too. Therefore
protable mergers in the three-rm case never reduce the prot of the non-merging rm,
in which case industry prot rises. We deduce that any protable merger is detrimental to
consumers.
Figure 5: A protable merger which benets consumers
However, it is not true in general, with more than three rms, that protable mergers
harm consumers. It may be, for example, that a merger between two rms with a strong
interactionwhich is therefore likely to be protablemight induce non-merging rms to
enter the fray and compete for the newly-protable consumer segment, with the result
that overall industry prots might fall and consumers are made better o¤. To illustrate
21Before the merger, the combined prot of the merging rms, say rms A and B, was at least (A +
B)p0, and since their combined reach falls after the merger, for the merger to be protable the minimum
price must rise.
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this possibility consider the following example, which draws from our analysis of triopoly
together with the symmetric case from section 2. Figure 5 shows the pattern of consumer
consideration. There are initially ve rms, where rms 4 and 5 reach precisely the same
set of consumers (depicted as the shaded set) and hence set price p = 0 in equilibrium.
Firms 1, 2 and 3 each have a single captive customer, a single consumer considers each
set of rms f1; 2g and f3; 4; 5g, while four consumers consider each set of rms f2; 3g and
f1; 4; 5g. (No consumers consider more than three rms.)
Since rms 4 and 5 set price zero, rms 1, 2 and 3 compete as triopolists as if the
shaded row on Figure 5 was eliminated. Here, rms 2 and 3 have the greatest competitive
interaction in this triopoly, and Proposition 1 implies that equilibrium takes the overlapping
duopoly form with rms 2 and 3 setting low prices and rms 1 and 2 setting high prices.
The proof of part (ii) of the Proposition shows that rm 1 obtains its captive prot (1 = 1),
while rms 2 and 3 obtain respective prots 2 = 6p0 and 3 = 5p0, where p0 =
2
7
is the
minimum price. Since rms 4 and 5 make zero prot industry prot is 29
7
. Due to the
asymmetry between rms, industry prot substantially exceeds the captive prot, 3.
Now suppose rms 4 and 5 merge. (Clearly this is a protable merger, as before the
rms obtained no prot.) The symmetry of the market implies that each rm now obtains
its captive prot (i = 1), so that industry prot falls to 4 after the merger, and consumers
overall are better o¤. Intuitively, before the merger the market was highly asymmetric,
which allowed rms to enjoy high prots, and the merger brings more intense symmetric
competition to the market. This example shows that not all protable mergers in our
setting are detrimental to consumers, but such competition-enhancing mergers appear to
be relatively rare.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to explore, in a parsimonious framework with price-setting
rms and homogeneous products, how the structure of consumer choice sets matters for
the nature of equilibrium price dispersion. The analysis has yielded a number of results
that we did not initially expect.
First, we found equilibria with segmented pricing patterns, i.e., with some rms only
pricing high and others only pricing low. Second, in the three-rm case we established
generically either that all rms set the same minimum price (in which case their prot
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was proportional to reach), or that pricing was segmented (so that one rm only set
low prices and one set only high prices). In prior literature multiplicity of equilibria has
gained considerable attention, and all such cases lie on the knife edge between these two
regimes. Third, the key to determining which of the two regimes applies was found to be
the proximity or otherwise of the correlation measures of pairwise interaction, and when
one pair of rms had signicantly stronger interaction than other pairs then segmented
pricing ensued. Fourth, for some parameter congurations we found equilibria with a gap
in one rms price support, so that that rm sometimes prices high, and sometimes low, but
never in between. Fifth, we found plausible patterns of consumer consideration in which
entry is detrimental to consumers because it softens competition between incumbents,
leading them to retreat towards their captive base. Likewise, there were situations where
an increase in the number of consumers who consider one pair of rms causes a third rm
to retreat towards its captive base, showing that search externalities need not benet all
consumers. Sixth, protable mergers were shown always to be detrimental to consumers in
the three-rm case, as in the special cases discussed in section 2, but not more generally.
The analysis could be extended in a number of directions. One would be to settings
beyond nested reach and the three-rm case that we have analysed in detail. For example,
one could seek more general conditions for equilibrium to take the overlapping duopoly
form, or one could try to establish that all rms use the same minimum price when (ap-
propriately generalised) competitive interactions are similar enough. Second, one could
investigate policy interventions in these kinds of markets. For example, when would the
imposition of a price cap on a large rm induce other rms to lower or raise their prices?
A third extension would be to endogenise the pattern of choice sets, beyond our analysis
of entry and mergers, by introducing search by consumers, word-of-mouth communication
between consumers, or advertising by rms.22 For instance, one could study a model of
non-sequential search where a consumer can determine her choice set S by incurring a
specied up-front search cost (increasing in S). Such a framework would generalize Bur-
dett and Judd (1983, section 3.2) to allow rms to be asymmetric and for consumers to
target specic rms for consideration. Alternatively, word-of-mouth communication could
mean that a rms reach was inuenced by the price it o¤ers.
22For instance, in the context of advertising, Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) study a sequential model
where rms rst invest in reach and then compete in price, while Butters (1977) studies the situation where
rms choose their reach and price simultaneously. (In each case reach is assumed to be independent.)
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Technical Appendix
Sketch proof of Lemma 1: We rst discuss arguments to do with deletion of dominated
prices. In any equilibrium we have i  i, since rm i can ensure at least this prot by
choosing price equal to 1 and serving its captive customers. For this reason, no rm would
ever o¤er a price below i, its captive-to-reach ratio, since if it did so it would obtain prot
below i even if it supplied its entire reach.
To see that every rm makes positive prot we invoke Assumption 2. There is at least
one rm i which has captive customers, and which will not set price below i > 0. (Clearly
this rm makes positive prot.) From the remaining rms, at least one rm j has captive
customers in the subset of rms excluding i, and so this rm can set price i and be sure
to obtain positive prot. Firm j therefore also has a positive lower bound on its prices.
Following the same argument, a rm in the subset of rms excluding both i and j can
obtain positive prot, and so on until the set of rms is exhausted. In particular, each
rms minimum price is strictly above zero and hence so is p0. This proves part (ii).
If price p < 1 is in rm is support then qi() in (1) cannot be at for prices just above
p, for otherwise the rm would obtain strictly greater prot by raising its price above
p. This implies that this price must be in the support of at least one other rm. More
precisely, if price p < 1 is in rm is support it must be in the support of at least one of
its potential competitors, where in a given equilibrium we say that rm j is a potential
competitor for rm i at price p if rm is expected demand falls when j slightly undercuts
i at price p given the equilibrium strategies followed by rms other than i and j. (This
then implies that i is a potential competitor for j.) If for all duopoly segments we have
ij > 0, then every rm is a potential competitor for every other rm. However, two
rms might have disjoint reaches, and so cannot be potential competitors. More generally,
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the overlap between i and j might be contained within a third rms reach, and if in the
equilibrium the third rm always chooses price below p, then i and j do not compete at
price p. If price p in rm is support was not in the support of at least one of its potential
competitors, rm is demand would be at (and positive) in this neighbourhood of p, which
is not compatible with p maximizing the rms prot.
We next turn to arguments concerning the possibility of atoms in the price distri-
butions. First observe that two rms cannot both have an atom at price p if they are
potential competitors at this price (for otherwise each would have an incentive to undercut
the price p and gain a discrete jump in demand).
To see that each rms price distribution is continuous in the interval [p0; 1), suppose
by contrast that rm i has an atom at some price 0 < p < 1 in its support. We claim that
rms i demand in (1) must then be locally at above p. As noted above, there cannot be
a potential competitor to i at price p which also has an atom at p, and so qi does not jump
down discretely at p. In addition, any potential competitor to i at p obtains a discrete
increase in demand if it slightly undercuts p, and so such a rm would never choose a price
immediately above p. Since no potential competitor chooses a price immediately above p,
rm i loses no demand if it raises its price slightly above p, which is not compatible with
p maximizing the rms prot. Therefore, rm i cannot have an atom below 1, and this
completes the proof of part (iii). This implies that each rms demand (1) is continuous
in the interval [p0; 1).
Similarly, if p0 is the minimum price ever chosen in the market, then all prices in the
interval [p0; 1] are sometimes chosen. If p is in rm is support but no rm is active in an
interval (p; p0) above p, then rm i has at demand over the range (p; p0), and this cannot
occur in equilibrium. This completes the proof of part (iv).
Suppose now that there are at least three rms. Let Pij denote the set of prices in
[p0; 1] which are in the supports of both rm i and rm j, which is a closed set. Part (iv)
implies that the collection fPijg covers the interval [p0; 1], and since each rm participates,
at least two of the sets in fPijg are non-empty. If there were no price in the support of
three or more rms then the collection fPijg would consist of disjoint sets. However, since
[p0; 1] is connected it cannot be covered by two or more disjoint closed sets, and we deduce
that at least two sets in fPijg must overlap, which proves part (v).
Firms can have an atom at the reservation price p = 1. However, as noted above, if
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rm i has an atom at p = 1 then no potential competitor can also have an atom at 1,
which implies that when rm i chooses p = 1 it sells only to its captive customers and so
its prot is precisely i = i. If no rm has an atom at p = 1 then any rm with p = 1
in its support (and there must be at two such rms from part (iv)) has prot equal to i.
This completes the proof for part (i).
Let rm j be a rm which obtains prot equal to j. Then the minimum price ever
chosen, p0, must be no higher than j (for otherwise rm j could obtain more prot by
choosing p = p0), and so p0 cannot exceed the highest i. Since no rm sets a price below
its i, the minimum price p0 (which from part (iv) is sometimes chosen by at least two
rms) must be weakly above the second lowest i. Finally, if the rm with the highest i
has p0 in its support, then p0 cannot be strictly lower than this highest i, and so must
equal this highest i. This completes the proof for part (vi).
Proof of Proposition 1: We construct an equilibrium of the stated form. The prot of the
largest rm n is n = n, its number of captive customers, and denote the prot of smaller
rms by i. In the highest interval [pn 1; 1] used by the two largest rms, these rms are
sure to be undercut by all smaller rivals, and so in this price range their CDFs must satisfy
n + n 1(1  Fn 1(p)) =
n
p
; n 1(1  Fn(p)) =
n 1
p
:
Since Fn(pn 1) = 0 it follows that pn 1 and n 1 are related as
n 1 = n 1pn 1 :
We have Fn 1(1) = 1, while the largest rm has an atom at p = 1 with probability
1  Fn(1) = n 1=n 1 = pn 1.
In the lowest interval [p1; p2] used by the two smallest rms, these rms are sure to
undercut all larger rivals, and so in this range their CDFs must satisfy
2 + 1(1  F1(p)) =
2
p
; 1(1  F2(p)) =
1
p
and since F1(p1) = F2(p1) = 0 it follows that
1 = 1p1 ; 2 = (1 + 2)p1 :
Since F1(p2) = 1 we have 2 = 2p2, which combined with the previous expression for 2
implies that
p2 =
1 + 2
2
p1 : (15)
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If there are just three rms, these are the two price intervals in the equilibrium. With
more than three rms there are intermediate intervals, and in the interval [pi; pi+1], where
1 < i < n   1, rms i and i + 1 are active and will be undercut by smaller rivals and
undercut their larger rivals. Therefore, in this range their CDFs must satisfy
i+1 + i(1  Fi(p)) =
i+1
p
; i(1  Fi+1(p)) =
i
p
: (16)
Since Fi+1(pi) = 0 it follows that
i = ipi :
An intermediate rm i, where 2  i  n   1, is active in both the intervals [pi 1; pi]
and [pi; pi+1], and its CDF Fi needs to be continuous across the threshold price pi. At the
price pi we therefore require that
i 1
i 1pi
= 1  Fi(pi) =
1
i

i+1
pi
  i+1

; (17)
where in the case of i = 2 we have written 1 = 1. If we write pn = 1 then we have
i = ipi for all rms 1  i  n, and so for 2  i  n 1 expression (17) entails expression
(8). This is a second-order di¤erence equation in pi where p1 is free, p2 is given in (15),
and the terminal condition pn = 1 serves to pin down p1. It is clear from (15) and (8) that
the sequence p1; p2; p3; ::: is an increasing sequence of price thresholds. This completes the
description of the candidate equilibrium.
We next show that no rm has an incentive to deviate from its described strategy. By
construction, rm i is indi¤erent between choosing any price in the interval [pi 1; pi+1],
assuming its rivals follow the stated strategies. We need to check that a rms prot is no
higher if it chooses a price outside this interval. Consider rst an upward price deviation,
which is only relevant if i < n  1. If i < n  2 and rm i chooses a price above pi+2 is has
no demand since rm i+ 1 is sure to set a lower price and all rm is potential customers
also consider rm (i + 1)s price. Suppose then that i < n   1 and rm i chooses a price
p 2 [pi+1; pi+2], in which case it has demand i if its price is below the prices of both rivals
i+ 1 and i+ 2. Therefore, from (16) its prot with such a price is
pi[1  Fi+1(p)][1  Fi+2(p)] =
ii+1
2i+1

i+2
p
  i+2

= pi+1
ii+2
i+1

pi+2
p
  1

:
This prot decreases from i = ipi at p = pi+1 to zero at p = pi+2. We deduce that rm
i cannot increase its prot by choosing a price above pi+1.
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Next consider a downward price deviation, so that rm i chooses a price below pi 1
(which is only relevant when i > 2). Suppose that this rm chooses a price in the interval
[pj; pj+1], where j  i  2. The rm will undercut all rms larger than rm j + 1, and so
obtain demand at least j+2 + ::: + i. It will also serve the segment j+1 if it undercuts
rm j + 1 and it will additionally serve the segment j if it undercuts both rms j and
j + 1. Putting this together implies that the rms prot with price p 2 [pj; pj+1] is
p

j+2 + :::+ i + (1  Fj+1(p))(j+1 + j(1  Fj(p))
	
: (18)
Given the CDFs in (16), this prot is a convex function of p and so must be maximized in
this range either at pj or at pj+1. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to deviations by
rm i > 2 to the threshold prices fp1; p2; :::; pi 2g. If it chooses price pj where 2  j  i 2,
expression (18) implies its prot is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j(1  Fj(pj))
	
:
Expression (17) implies that j(1   Fj(pj)) is equal to j+1(
pj+1
pj
  1), in which case the
above deviation prot with price pj is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j+1(
pj+1
pj
  1)

= j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj : (19)
One can check that expression (19) holds also for j = 1. We need to show that (19) is no
higher than rm is equilibrium prot, which is i = ipi. We do this in two steps: (i) we
show that (19) is increasing in j given i, so that j = i   2 is the most tempting of these
deviations for rm i, and (ii) we show (19) is below ipi when j = i  2.
To show (i), suppose that i  4, which is the only relevant case, and suppose that
1  j  i  3. Then rm is deviation prot with price pj+1 from (19) is
j+2pj+2 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1 = j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1
 j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1   (j+2   j+1)(pj+1   pj)
= j+1pj+1 + j+2pj + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1  j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj
where the nal expression is the rms deviation prot with price pj, which proves claim
(i). (Here, the rst equality follows from (8), the rst inequality follows from (7) and the
fact that fpjg is an increasing sequence, while the nal inequality follows from fpjg being
an increasing sequence.)
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To show claim (ii), suppose that i  3 which is the only relevant case, and observe that
ipi = i 1pi 2 + ipi 1
 i 1pi 2 + ipi 1   (i   i 1)(pi 1   pi 2)
= i 1pi 1 + ipi 2
where the nal expression is (19) when j = i  2. (Here, the rst equality follows from (8)
and the inequality follows from fig being an increasing sequence.) This completes the
proof that the stated strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Lemma 1 shows that in any equilibrium each price in the range
[p0; 1] is chosen by at least two rms, where p0 denotes the minimum price o¤ered by any
rm in the equilibrium. In particular, either two or all three rms have p0 in their supports.
The lemma also shows that there is at least one price in all three price supports. Let L and
H denote respectively the lowest and highest price among the prices in all three supports.
(The set of prices in all three supports is closed.)
(i) Suppose that an equilibrium has L > p0, so that only two rms, say rms i and j,
o¤er the minimum price p0. These rms obtain prot i = ip0 and j = jp0 and in the
interval [p0; L] where Gk(p) = 0 expression (10) implies
ijGj(p) = ijGi(p) = 1 
p0
p
: (20)
This implies that Gi  Gj in this interval and let  = Gi(L) = Gj(L) > 0.
Firm k weakly prefers price L to price p0, and so (10) implies
kp0  kL[1  ikGi(L)  jkGj(L) + Gi(L)Gj(L)] : (21)
(Here, the left-hand side is its prot if it chooses p0, when it will serve its entire reach,
while the right-hand side is its prot with the higher price.) This inequality can be written
as
ik + jk   
2  1 
p0
L
= ij
where the equality follows from (20). We can divide by  > 0 to obtain
ij  ik + jk    : (22)
Since  = Gi(L)  i and  = Gj(L)  j, the term  is weakly below both ik and jk.
Expression (22) therefore implies that ij is weakly greater than both ik and jk, and so
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using the stated labelling for rms we have k = 1 and the two low-price rms are rms 2
and 3. Since   minf2; 3g, expression (22) then implies
23  12 + 13     12 + 13   minf2; 3g : (23)
Therefore, if (11) holds the equilibrium cannot take the form where L > p0, and the only
alternative is that all three rms use the same minimum price p0. Lemma 1 (vi) shows
that this minimum price must then be the highest captive-to-reach ratio.
(ii) If condition (12) holds we will show that L = H so there is only one price in all three
supports. Either all three rms have the same minimum price p0 or only two rms do, and
in the latter case the proof for part (i) shows that it must be rms 2 and 3 which price low.
In either case rms 2 and 3 use p0, and in either case we have G2(L) = G3(L) =   0.
Suppose by contradiction that in equilibrium we have H > L. Let i and j label rms
2 and 3 such that Gi(H)  Gj(H). Then since we cannot have only rm 1 active in
the open interval (L;H), one or both of 2 and 3 must choose prices in (L;H), and so
 = Gi(L) < Gi(H)  g.
Firms 2 and 3 obtain respective prots p02 and p03, and let 1 denote rm 1s prot.
Expression (10) shows that a price p in rm 1s support satises
1 = 1p[1  12G2(p)  13G3(p) + G2(p)G3(p)] ;
and setting p = L;H in the above and subtracting implies that
1
1

1
L
 
1
H

= 12G2(H) + 13G3(H)  G2(H)G3(H)
 12G2(L)  13G3(L) + G2(L)G3(L)
 12g + 13g   g
2   12   13 + 
2
= (g   )(12 + 13   (g + )) : (24)
Here, the inequality follows since 12  G3(H) and 13  G2(H), and so the initial
expression is weakly increased if we replace Gj(H) by g = Gi(H)  Gj(H). Likewise, and
using that fact that G1(L) = 0, for rm j we have
p0

1
L
 
1
H

= 23Gi(H) + 1jG1(H)  G1(H)Gi(H)  23Gi(L)
= 23g + 1jG1(H)  gG1(H)  23
 23(g   ) :
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Since 1  1p0 (as rm 1 weakly prefers any price in its support to p0) and g    > 0, it
follows that
23  12 + 13   (g + ) : (25)
If  = 0 (so no consumers consider all three rms) this inequality contradicts (12), so
we deduce that it is not possible to have H > L when (12) holds and  = 0. Therefore,
suppose henceforth that  > 0. Then since g > 0 the inequality (25) contradicts the rst
inequality in (23) which holds whenever L > p0. We deduce that if H > L then all three
rms must have the same minimum price p0 and hence  = 0.
We show next that if all three rms have the same minimum price, then (12) cannot
hold. First suppose that H < 1, so that only two rms are active in the upper range
(H; 1]. If rm 1 uses p = 1, then one of rms 2 or 3 has its maximum price at H, so that
G2(H) = 2 or G3(H) = 3. Therefore g = Gi(H)  minf2; 3g, in which case (25) is
inconsistent with (12).
Continue with the assumption that H < 1, but now suppose it is rms 2 and 3 which
are active above H, so that G1(H) = 1. Since all three rms have prot equal to p0
multiplied by their reach, (10) implies that for rm 1 and rm j we have respectively
p0 = H [1  12G2(H)  13G3(H) + G2(H)G3(H)]
p0 = H

1  1j1   23Gi(H) + 1Gi(H)

;
and combining these yields
(23   1i)Gi(H) = (1j   Gi(H))(Gj(H)  1) : (26)
However, condition (12) implies 23 > maxf12; 13g, and since Gi(H) > 0 it follows that
the right-hand side above is strictly positive, and in particular we have
1 < minfG2(H); G3(H)g : (27)
Since rms 2 and 3 both use p = H and p = 1, while G1(H) = 1, for each k = 2; 3 we
have
p0

1
H
  1

= (23   1)(Gk(1) Gk(H)) : (28)
Write   G2(1) G2(H) = G3(1) G3(H) > 0. Note (28) implies that 23 > 1 so that
23 > 0 and there are some consumers who consider rms 2 and 3. As such, at most one
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of these rms can have an atom at p = 1. Since rm 1 weakly prefers p = H to p = 1, we
have
p0

1
H
  1

 12G2(1) + 13G3(1)  G2(1)G3(1)
 12G2(H) + 13G3(H)  G2(H)G3(H)
=  [12 + 13   (G2(H) +G3(H) + )] :
Since  > 0, combining this inequality with (28) implies
23   1  12 + 13   (G2(H) +G3(H) + ) ;
or
minf2; 3g  12 + 13   23   (G2(H) +G3(H) +    1  minf2; 3g) : (29)
At most one of rms 2 and 3 has at atom at p = 1, so suppose that rm k 2 f2; 3g has no
atom, so that
Gk(H) +  = Gk(1) = k  minf2; 3g :
Combining this inequality with (27) and (29) then contradicts condition (12).
The nal case to consider is when H = 1, so that all three rms use the highest price.
If at most one of rms 2 and 3 has an atom at p = 1 then either G2(1) = 2 or G3(1) = 3
(or both). Therefore g  minf2; 3g, in which case (25) is inconsistent with (12). If both
rms 2 and 3 have an atom at p = 1 then we must have 23 = 0 otherwise the rms have
an incentive to undercut one another at p = 1. It follows that 1 = 23, in which case
(12) implies
(1 +minf2; 3g) > 12 + 13  (2 + 3)
and so 1 > maxf2; 3g. Since not all consumers are captive, when rms 2 and 3 each
have an atom at p = 1, rm 1 cannot do so and G1(1) = 1. Then the argument leading
to the previous expression (27) applies, with H = 1, which contradicts our nding that
1 > maxf2; 3g.
In sum, we have shown that when (12) holds, there is only one price in the support
of all three rms, say p1. In particular, only two rms o¤er the minimum price p0, and
these are rms 2 and 3. Clearly p0 < p1 and only rms 2 and 3 are active in the range
[p0; p1). If p1 = 1 then the proof is complete. If p1 < 1 then there is no price in (p1; 1] in
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the support of all rms, and so only two rms are active in this range, one of which must
be rm 1. The remaining issue is which of rms 2 and 3 is the other rm active above p1.
Suppose henceforth that rms 2 and 3 are labelled so 2  3. Expression (20) implies
that 2F2(p) = 3F3(p) in the range [p0; p1]. If 2 = 3 then F2 = F3, and so one of these
rms cannot drop out before the other and we must have p1 = 1. If 2 > 3 then in the
range [p0; p1] we have F3 > F2 and so it is rm 3 which drops out rst.
The nal step in the proof is to determine the prots of the three rms, as well as the
price thresholds p0 and p1. Since rms 2 and 3 have p0 as their minimum price in this
equilibrium, their prots are 2 = 2p0 and 3 = 3p0. In the range [p0; p1] their CDFs
are given by (20), and rm 3 drops out at price p1, so that the ratio p0=p1 satises
233 = 1 
p0
p1
: (30)
Expression (20) then implies that
G2(p1) = 3 : (31)
Either rm 1 or 2 (or both) obtains exactly its captive prot.23 Suppose rst that rm
1 obtains its captive prot, so that 1 = 1. For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] rms 1
and 2 compete and are sure to be undercut by rm 3, so from (10) rm 2s CDF satises
1  12G2   133 + 3G2 =
1
p
;
where recall that 1 is rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio. In order for G2() to be continuous
at the threshold price p1, (31) implies that
1  123   133 + 
2
3 =
1
p1
;
which determines p1. Expression (30) in turn implies that
p0 = p1(1  233) =
1(1  233)
1  123   133 + 
2
3
: (32)
It is convenient to write P for the right-hand side above, so that
P =
1(1  233)
1  123   133 + 
2
3
=
1(2 + 12)
12 + 12(2   3)
; (33)
23If one of these rms has no atom at p = 1 then the other obtains its captive prot when it chooses
p = 1. If both have an atom at p = 1 then for neither to have an incentive to undercut the other we must
have 12 = 0, in which case both rms obtain their captive prot at p = 1.
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where the second equality follows by routine manipulation. Note from the rst expression
for P above that the condition P > 1 is equivalent to (11), and P < 1 corresponds
to (12). Note also that P  (2 + 12)=2, and so a su¢cient condition for overlapping
duopoly to be the equilibrium is that
2 + 12
2
< 1 :
In words, this condition states that the higher captive-to-reach ratio in the duopoly market
with just rms 2 and 3 present is below rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio in the triopoly
market. Expression (32) implies
p1 =
12
12 + 12(2   3)
: (34)
Alternatively, suppose rm 2 obtains its captive prot, so that 2 = 2. Since the rm
has p0 as its lowest price it follows that
p0 = 2 : (35)
Expression (30) then implies that
p1 =
2
2 + 12
: (36)
For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] rm 2s CDF now satises
1  12G2   133 + 3G2 =
1
1p
;
where 1 is rm 1s prot (to be determined). For G2 to be continuous at p = p1 =
2=(2 + 12), (31) implies that
1  123   133 + 
2
3 =
2 + 12
2

1
1
;
which determines 1. This can be expressed as
1 =
12
P
(37)
where P is given in (33).
We next determine when it is that rm 1 or rm 2 obtains its captive prot. When
rm 1 obtains its captive prot, rm 2s minimum price is P in (33), which must be no
lower than 2 if rm 2 is willing to o¤er this price. Therefore, if P < 2 the equilibrium
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must instead have rm 2 obtaining its captive prot, in which case the threshold prices
and rm 1s prot are given respectively by (35), (36) and (37). Conversely, when rm 2
obtains its captive prot, rm 1s prot is given in (37). This prot cannot be below its
captive prot 1, which therefore requires P  2. Therefore, if P > 2 the equilibrium
must involve rm 1 obtaining its captive prot, so 1 = 1, and the threshold prices p0 and
p1 are given respectively by (33) and (34). Finally, in the knife-edge case where P = 2 the
two equilibria coincide, and rms 1 and 2 each obtain their captive prot. This completes
the proof.
Details for the nested example in section 4: Recall that the example in the text has nested
reach with 3 =
1
2
, 2 =
4
5
and 1 = 1. Then part (i) of Proposition 2 applies, and all rms
use the same minimum price p0 =
1
5
(which is rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio) and have
prots ip0. In this example we have 12 = 13 = 1 and 23 =  =
5
4
, and so expression
(10) implies that for any price in the support of all three rms we have
1 +
5
4
G1G2  
5
4
G2  G1 = 1 +
5
4
G1G3  
5
4
G3  G1 = 1 +
5
4
G2G3  G2  G3 =
1
5p
: (38)
These simultaneous equations can be solved to give each Gi as a function of p:
G1(p) = 1 
2
5
s
1
p(1  p)
; G2(p) = G3(p) =
4
5
 
2
5
r
1  p
p
: (39)
These adjusted CDFs are each zero at p = p0 and G2 and G3 increase with p for prices
above p0.
A rst guess at the solution would be that all three rms choose prices in the range
[p0; p1], then rm 3 drops out leaving rms 1 and 2 active in the range [p1; 1]. Here F3
reaches 1, i.e., G3 reaches 3 =
1
2
, i.e., , at p1 =
16
25
. For prices above p1 rms 1 and 2
compete alone, with rm 3 sure to undercut them, in which case the required adjusted
CDFs in (38) are given by
G1(p) = 1 
8
15p
; G2(p) =
4
3
 
8
15p
:
The problem with this candidate solution, however, is that G1 = F1 in (39) increases
with p only for prices below 1
2
, and thereafter it decreases with p as depicted as the solid
curve on Figure 3 in the text. The correct solution is then obtained by ironing this CDF
as shown as the dashed line on the gure so that F1 is attened to be no greater than the
level F1(p1) =
1
6
for prices below p1. The smaller root of G1 =
1
6
in (39) is p^ = 9
25
.
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In this example, all three rms are active in the price range [1
5
; 9
25
], only rms 2 and
3 are active in the interior range [ 9
25
; 16
25
], and then only rms 1 and 2 are active in the
range [16
25
; 1]. In the interior range [ 9
25
; 16
25
], the adjusted CDFs G2 and G3 need modifying
from (39) to reect that they will be undercut by rm 1 with the constant probability
F1(p1) =
1
6
in this range (in which case they have no demand), so that
G2(p) = G3(p) =
4
5
 
24
125p
:
(Again, G3 reaches 3 =
1
2
at p1 =
15
25
.) With these CDFs, one can check that rm 1 does
not gain by choosing a price in the interior range [ 9
25
; 16
25
], and that rm 3 has no incentive
to choose a price above p1 =
16
25
, so that is indeed an equilibrium.
Proof that a protable merger increases rm N s prot in section 4: Recall that the case
requiring analysis was the e¤ect on the prot of rm 1 of a merger between rms 2 and
3 starting from the conditions of part (ii) of Proposition 2 and with P < 2 so that rm
1 obtained more than its captive prot as in (37). Using (33) we can bound rm 1s
pre-merger prot by
1 =
12
P
= 2
12 + 12(2   3)
2 + 12

12
2 + 12
+ 212
because 2   3  2 + 12. As P < 2 is equivalent to
1 < 2(2   3) ; (40)
it is apparent that 1 < 2  M , and so rm 1s post-merger prot will be 1M , where
M > 2 is the captive-to-reach ratio of the merged rm and the inequality follows from
the merger being protable. The merger will therefore increase 1s prot if
0 < M1  

12
2 + 12
+ 212

=

M  
2
2 + 12

1 + (M   2)12 + M(13 + )
=

(1  M)3   (13 + )
2 + 12

1 + (M   2)12 + M(13 + ) : (41)
This condition is met if if M >
1
2+12
because the factors multiplying 1, 12 and (13+)
in (41) are then all positive: This last inequality does hold when P < 2 because
1
2 + 12
<
1
2   3
< 2 < M
using (40) and the assumption that the merger is protable. This completes the proof.
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